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ENHANCED INJURY: A DIRECTION FOR
WASHINGTON
Most jurisdictions recognize products liability claims for what are com-
monly termed enhanced injuries. 1 Enhanced injuries occur when a plaintiff
sustains injuries in addition to those which would have been sustained with
a product of reasonably safe design. Thus, the enhanced injury claim
recognizes liability for defective designs even when the defect does not
cause the underlying accident.2
Enhanced injury claims require the same general proofs common in all
products liability actions. 3 They are unique, however, because they may
require greater levels of substantiated evidence regarding the extent of
injury enhancement or "apportionment." 4 Once causation is shown in an
enhanced injury case, one party must bear the burden of proving apportion-
ment of the harm attributable to the defective design. This apportionment,
while simple in theory, is often difficult to prove in practice. Hence, the
placing of the burden may, in practical effect, determine whether the
plaintiff will recover on the claim. The issue of whether this burden should
rest with the plaintiff or the defendant has raised great controversy and
division among the jurisdictions, and is the primary focus of this Com-
ment.
This Comment emphasizes automotive design. This is for two reasons.
Most enhanced injury cases arise in this context, and, more significantly,
no other product is associated with stronger public policy considerations
nor affects society more broadly than the automobile.
When faced with a case of first impression involving enhanced injury,
courts can and should draw from many sources in developing an approach
to the apportionment problem. First, the courts should look to the treatment
enhanced injury cases have received in other jurisdictions. Second, they
should seek guidance and analogize, if possible, from established tort
1. Other courts and commentators have, alternatively, termed the claim as one involving "crash-
worthiness" or "second collision." For a more complete description and discussion of these terms, see
generally Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory: An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REv. 643, 647-51
(1984).
2. Most courts that have addressed the issue have recognized the right to recover for enhanced
injuries. The landmark decision allowing recovery was Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495
(8th Cir. 1968). The leading decision rejecting the concept of enhanced injury liability, Evans v.
General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966), was overruled in
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 648 F.2d
833, 840 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981), the court noted that most jurisdictions
considering the issue have adopted theLarsen approach. See also infra text accompanying notes 67-92.
3. See infra text accompanying note 25.
4. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text (Part II.B).
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doctrines. Finally, and most importantly, they should examine and weigh
the policies that underlie the claim. Policy considerations may be found by
examining case law, statutes, and legislative history.
The search for useful guidance in Washington is somewhat complicated.
One reason for this is that, although Washington has recognized the
enhanced injury claim, 5 it has not explored issues6 concerning placement
of the burden of apportionment. 7 Another complication is that, although
Washington has extensive experience with products liability claims arising
under negligence, strict liability, and warranty, recent statutory revisions
may change the doctrinal significance of these cases and alter the focus and
emphasis of underlying product liability policies. 8 These possible changes
5. Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974) (a manufacturer
may be held liable in negligence and/or strict liability for designs or defects in the seatbelt and seat
anchoring which proximately cause enhanced injuries). See also infra notes 6-7.
6. In Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974), the court did
not address apportionment and other enhanced injury issues. The court did note, however, that with
respect to negligence theory, the plaintiff "has the usual burdens of proof as in any negligence action
including proof of the nature and extent of the injuries proximately caused or enhanced by the defect."
Id. at 758, 522 P.2d at 833. With respect to the application of strict liability, the court stated in dicta:
"There is no reason why the theory should not be applied in these enhanced injury cases ifa plaintiff can
prove the necessary elements set forth in Ulmer. " Id. at 759, 522 P. 2d at 834 (referring to Ulmer v. Ford
Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969)).
Ulmer consists of a five-part test. The plaintiff must prove in a strict liability action: (1) that a defect,
(2) existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer (3) which was not contemplated by
the user, (4) which rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, and (5) which was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. 75 Wn. 2d at 535, 452 P.2d at 736 (1969). For an analysis of these
elements, see Comment, Products Liability-Tort Reform: An Overview of Washington's New Act, 17
GONz. L. REv.357, 379-80 & nn.99-103 (1982).
7. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn. 2d 145, 148-50, 542 P.2d 774, 776-77 (1975).
Plaintiff alleged a claim against the importer of a Volkswagen microbus based solely on strict liability,
contending that a design defect either caused or enhanced the injuries to the driver and passenger,
resulting in their deaths. The trial court granted a summary judgment for the defendant, apparently
finding as a matter of law that the decedents voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger.
The court of appeals, finding this a factual issue, reversed, and the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals. No consideration of the apportionment issue is presented in the opinion.
Neither the courts nor the legislature have further defined the parameters of the state's enhanced
injury claim. See, e.g., Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co., 87 Wn. 2d 406,553 P.2d 107 (1976) (the
only issue properly before the court was the viability of plaintiff's enhanced injury theory). The Tort
Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010-.060 (1985), does not address enhanced injury
theory and the need for treatment different from that in ordinary tort cases with respect to burdens of
proof in apportionment.
8. See Tort Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.010-.060 (1985); infra notes 10-23,
141-48 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that another, more recent legislative enactment "repeals" the Washington Tort
Reform Act's treatment of joint and several liability, as well as imposes damage limits, attorney fee
limits, and periodic payments for awards of future damages. The Liability Reform Act of 1986,
E.S.S.B. 4630, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. [hereinafter cited as 1986 Act], eliminates joint and several
liability and instead imposes only several liability, except where the plaintiff has not contributed to the
fault, the harm is indivisible, or the defendants were acting in concert. In cases where the plaintiff has
contributed to the fault, the defendant(s) would only have to pay their portion of the damage award
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complicate the analysis of product liability actions in Washington, and
necessarily constrain development of enhanced injury doctrines. 9
I. THE TORT REFORM ACT OF 1981
Negligence, 10 strict liability,"1 and warranty12 represent the three general
theories by which injured parties might pursue a products liability action in
Washington. 13 The Tort Reform Act of 1981, which applies to claims
arising after July 26, 1981, made substantial changes in the application of
these doctrines. 14 Under the Act, liability for product injuries differs for
manufacturers and other product sellers. Section 7.72.040(1) of the Re-
vised Code of Washington (RCW) provides that a product seller other than
a manufacturer ordinarily is liable to the claimant "only if" the claim
comes within three narrow exceptions. The exceptions which impose
determined according to their percentage of fault. Any risk of insolvency would be borne by the
plaintiff. This scheme is directly contrary to current law, which allows the plaintiff to recover from any
defendant the full amount of his damages.
The 1986 Act will significantly change both the focus and outcome of Washington tort doctrines and
policy. In essence, the legislation places protection of defendants above the interests of providing full
recovery to an injured plaintiff. Indeed, discussion drafts indicate an intention to reduce the exposure of
defendants to "unlimited. . . distorted awards." Such a damage-limitation policy places a premium
on the defendant's proving an amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff. Some degree of fault of the
plaintiff, however small (one percent is mentioned in the discussion draft), can almost always be
demonstrated. Hence, in practical effect, the legislation will eliminate joint and several liability in this
state. See generally, Discussion Draft, 1986 Legislative Session (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review).
It is also interesting that the 1986 Act, which limits damages for pain and suffering (non-economic
damages), is more severe than comparable reforms in other states. Under prior Washington law, juries
rendered large awards under the guise of compensation for pain and suffering to punish "bad actors," as
Washington does not recognize punitive/exemplary damages. Only six other states disallow punitive
damages (Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Puerto Rico, and Virginia). Of these, none
place limits on non-economic damages.
9. See infra notes 10-23 and accompanying text (Part I) for further discussion of the Act.
10. See, e.g., Martin v. Schoonover, 13 Wn. App. 48, 533 P.2d 438 (1975):
The elements to be proven in a products liability case based upon the alleged negligence of a
seller of a product are (a) the offer of sale of the product by a retailer, (b) a duty of care in the
retailer, (c) a failure by act or omission to perform the duty, (d) an injury occurring from use of the
product and (e) the proximate cause of the injury was a failure to perform the duty.
Id. at 54, 533 P.2d at 442.
11. See, e.g., Teagle v. Fischer& Porter Co., 89 Wn. 2d 149,570 P.2d438 (1977); Bich v. General
Elec. Co., 27 Wn. App. 25, 614 P.2d 1323 (1980); Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wn. App. 816,
572 P.2d 737 (1977), rev'd, 91 Wn. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233 (1978); Litts v. Pierce County, 9 Wn. App.
843, 515 P.2d 526 (1973); Baker v. City of Seattle, 2 Wn. App. 1003, 471 P.2d 693 (1970), rev'd, 79
Wn. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971).
12. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wn. 2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979) (express
warranty); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wn. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963) (implied warranty).
13. For further discussion, see Comment, supra note 6, at 372-73.
14. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.920 (1985). This section was not amended by the Liability Reform
Act of 1986, E.S.S.B. 4630, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. See supra note 8.
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liability on the sellers arise when the harm is caused by: (1) the negligence
of the product seller; (2) the breach of an express warranty made by the
seller; or (3) the seller's intentional misrepresentation of facts about the
product or intentional concealment of information concerning the product.
Prior to enactment of the statute, the Washington courts had allowed
recovery for harm to persons not in privity with a manufacturer or seller on
both negligence and strict liability principles. 15 The statute bases liability
of manufacturers solely upon negligence, with an exception for strict
liability when a product deviates in some material way from the design
specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer, or from
otherwise identical units of the same product line. 16
It is possible, however, that two subsections of the Act 17 preserve prior
common law. 18 The first, RCW 7.72.020, directs that the statute limit
existing common law "only to the extent" set forth in the Act. The second,
RCW 7.72.030, states a set of conditions under which a product manufac-
turer is liable, but does not state that a product manufacturer is only liable
on the conditions stated in the section. This is in marked contrast with
RCW 7.72.040, which imposes liability on product sellers other than
manufacturers only if specified conditions are met.
The statutory language, when combined with indications that the Wash-
ington Supreme Court will give a restrictive reading to legislation attempt-
ing to limit the effect of its judicially developed tort law, 19 supports the
15. See, e.g., Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wn. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976); Mazetti v.
Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913). See also Wagner v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wn. App.
558, 643 P.2d 906 (1982); Martin v. Schoonover, 13 Wn. App. 48, 533 P.2d 438 (1975).
To recover under common law strict product liability theory, the plaintiff had to show that a defect
existed at the time the product left the hands of the manufacturer, which (1) was not contemplated by the
user; (2) rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; and (3) was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. E.g., Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Wn. App. 83, 505 P.2d
139 (1972). Express and implied (merchantability and fitness) warranty are other theories under which
one might pursue a claim for injury due to a defective product. See WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(2)
(1985). See also Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wn. 2d 184, 196, 484 P.2d 380, 386 (1971) (dealer "impliedly
warrants that the automobile . . . is fit to transport the driver and his passengers with reasonable
safety."). See also supra note 12.
For an extensive treatment of Washington products liability, see Comment, supra note 6. The
Comment discusses Washington development in this area and changes brought by the 1981 Tort Reform
Act.
16. Such deviations or defects might include those due to improper construction or breach of
warranty. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.030(1), (2) (1985).
17. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.020-.030 (1985). These sections remain intact after the Liability
Reform Act of 1986, E.S.S.B., 4630, 49th Leg., Reg. Session. See supra note 8.
18. For a complete discussion, see generally C. Peck & R. Roddis. The Tort Reform Act of 1981:
Materials for a Continuing Legal Education Seminar (Oct. 29, 1983) (available in University of
Washington Law School Library). For differing views and further analysis, see PROFESSIONAL EDuC.
SYS., INC., WASHINGTON PRODUCT LIABILITY (1983); WASHINGTON STATE BAR AsS'N., TORT AND
PRODUCTS LIABILITY PRACTICE (1984).
19. C. Peck & R. Roddis, supra note 18, at 2 (§ II C). Compare Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wn. 2d 246,
Vol. 61:571, 1986
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argument that common law actions may coexist with rights created under
the Act.20 Nonetheless, some commentators take an opposite view, citing
the Final Report of the Washington State Senate Select Committee on Tort
& Product Liability Reform, which states that the standards of liability set
forth in RCW 7.72.030 are the exclusive grounds for relief as to the kind of
product defects covered by that section.21
The implications of the Act are many and far-reaching. Not only does the
Act possibly affect precedential value of prior common law, it may change
underlying policies the legislature deems important and perhaps overrid-
ing.22 In the enhanced injury context, the analysis is more complicated
because such claims are not addressed in the Act. Hence, courts must
carefully scrutinize the interaction of common law doctrines with policies
enunciated by the Act23 to properly address the standards by which claims
for enhanced injuries are to be resolved.
II. THE ENHANCED INJURY: BASIC CONCEPTS
Enhanced injury liability is based on the premise that products, while not
manufactured for the purpose of undergoing impact, should be designed to
minimize injury in the event of an impact.24 A design defect may enhance
the injury sustained in an accident in two basic ways: (1) the defect may
cause a second collision itself, such as where a defective design allows an
occupant to be thrown from a vehicle; or (2) the defect may cause additional
injuries through deficiencies in the vehicle's interior surface with which the
occupant collides during a second collision.
Enhanced injury cases involve proof of the same basic elements required
in any tort case.25 Under negligence theory, for instance, in order to state a
cause of action a plaintiff must establish: (1) that the defendant owed a duty
to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached that duty; (3) that the breach
proximately caused the injury claimed; and (4) that the plaintiff has
suffered damage.2 6
595 P.2d 919 (1979) (reinstating the rule of Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974), after
enactment of a statute believed by many to have overturned that rule).
20. See C. Peck & R. Roddis, supra note 18, at 3 (§ IV.A, B).
21. Id. at 3 (§ IV A) (citing WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELEcr COMMrITEE ON TORT & PRODUCT
LIABILrY REFoRM, FINAL REPORT 1, at 33 (Jan. 1981)). See also supra note 18.
22. See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. But see supra note 8.
23. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 133-48.
24. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
25. Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 751, 758-59, 522 P.2d 829, 833-34
(1974). See Comment, Limitations onManufacturerLiability in Second Collision Actions, 43 MONT. L.
REV. 109, 113 (1982). See also supra note 6.
26. W. PRossER & W. KEETON, PRossER AND KEEmTON ON TORTs § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984);
e.g., Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wn. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984).
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Difficulties in the enhanced injury context arise not with the elements of
the torts,27 but with how the courts interpret and utilize them. In particular,
the courts have struggled with, and perhaps confused issues related to,
breadth of duty28 and apportionment. 29 Consequently, though perhaps
inadvertently, they have limited the viability of enhanced injury claims.
The issues relating to apportionment comprise the more complex aspects
of the enhanced injury question. Nevertheless, confusion surrounding
breadth of duty issues adds to the uncertainty and lack of uniformity found
in the enhanced injury context.
A. The Breadth of the Duty
Before plaintiffs may recover for enhanced injuries they must show that
the manufacturer has breached a duty regarding some aspect of the vehi-
cle's safety. Courts have held that manufacturers have a duty to take
reasonable steps to minimize the injury-producing effects of contact with
their products or conduct. 30 However, courts have stopped short of requir-
ing that products be as safe as technologically possible. 31
While the courts have uniformly recognized the existence of this duty,
they have had difficulty in agreeing upon or defining how "safe" a product
must be-determining the breadth of the duty. 32 Resolution of this issue
has depended on both the facts of each case and the tort doctrines of the
jurisdiction. Few consistent guidelines have emerged. Courts may use
concepts of foreseeability and reasonableness to limit liability or recovery.
However, confusion arises when courts mix analysis of the existence of
27. See Comment, supra note 25, at 113-15.
28. Items 1-3 in the negligence formula quoted in the text accompanying note 26. Breadth of duty
suggests that issues of foreseeability and reasonableness of design or risk should be examined. See infra
notes 30-53 and accompanying text.
29. Item 4 in the negligence formula quoted in the text accompanying note 26. There must be a
causal apportionment between the injuries sustained as a result of the first collision or accident and
those due to the alleged defect(s) or "second collision." See infra text beginning at note 54.
Judicially required proof(s) may confuse apportionment with proximate cause issues and ignore
underlying tort policies which seek generally to provide full recovery to injured claimants. One such
example of poorly drawn proof standards includes that utilized by courts following the decision of
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), which requires plaintiffs to prove all of the following: (1)
that an alternate, safer design was practicable or feasible under the circumstances; (2) what injury, if
any, would have been suffered if the alternate design had been used; and (3) the extent to which the
injuries actually suffered were enhanced by the alleged design defect. Id. at 737-38. For further
discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 67-82, 123-32.
30. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 501-03 (8th Cir. 1968).
31. In other words, the product does not have to be absolutely safe. It is in this context that the
courts speak of the breadth of the duty. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir.
198 1); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33
N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1973).
32. See supra note 31.
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duty with other issues33 more properly resolved in contexts such as appor-
tionment. 34
For example, in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 35 the Fourth
Circuit qualified the manufacturer's liability by recognizing limits of "fore-
seeability" and what constitutes an "unreasonable risk." The plaintiff, a
passenger in a Volkswagen microbus, was injured in a head-on collision
with a telephone pole at approximately forty miles per hour. The plaintiff
contended the manufacturer was guilty of negligent design resulting in
want of crashworthiness 36 of the vehicle. 37 The lower court had found the
manufacturer negligent in not designing a vehicle capable of withstanding
the forty mile per hour impact with the passenger area remaining intact.
The court of appeals reversed, finding the manufacturer innocent of negli-
gent design. 38 Cautioning against overbroad applications of foreseeability
and unreasonable risk, the court stated:
The mere fact, however, that automobile collisions are frequent enough to be
foreseeable is not sufficient in and of itself to create a duty on the part of the
manufacturer to design its car to withstand such collisions under any circum-
stances. Foreseeability. . .is not to be equated with duty; it is, after all, but
one factor, albeit an important one, to be weighed in determining the issue of
duty .... 39
The key phrase . . . is "unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a
collision," not foreseeability of collision. . . .Whether or not this has
33. Courts have added confusion to the development of apportionment doctrines by not clearly
delineating their discussions and by casual treatment of the apportionment issue-often developing
tests and standards without focusing on the effects of their implementation. See, e.g., Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), discussed infra text accompanying notes 68-72; Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976), discussed infra text accompanying notes 76-82.
34. For instances where the courts have in effect negated the apportionment requirement, see infra
note 92 and accompanying text.
35. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (negligence theory, applying Virginia law).
36. "Crashworthiness" is a term of art by which engineers describe the performance of a structure
or vehicle during a collision.
37. More specifically, plaintiffs contended that the lack of crush distance available to absorb
energy rendered the design defective. Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1068-69.
Useful information for the practitioner regarding automotive design liability may be found in R.
GOODMAN & THE CENTER FOR AuTo SAFETY, AUToMOBILE DESIGN LIABILITY (2d ed. 1983).
38. Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d at 1068-69. Given the size, weight, dimensions, and cost of the
microbus, it was technically and economically infeasible to provide sufficient crush characteristics, and
hence energy absorption, which would have ensured integrity of the front compartment at 40 miles per
hour. For technical background, see generally N. JONES & T. WIERZBICKI, STRUcruRAL CRASH-
woRTHINESs (1983); 1 MEcH. ENG'G CONFERENCE PUBLICATIONS 1980-3, TOWARD SAFER PASSENGER
CARS (1980); S.A.E., PROCEEDINGS OF TWENTY-THIRD STAPP CAR CRASH CONFERENCE (1979); U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL CONFERENCE ON EXPERIMENTAL SAFETY
VEHICLES (1979).
39. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in
original) (footnotes omitted).
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occurred should be determined by general [tort] principles, which involve a
balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens
against the burden of the precautions which would be effective to avoid the
harm. . . . In every case, the utility and purpose of the particular type of
vehicle will govern in varying degree the standards of safety to be observed in
its design. 40
The court considered many factors in weighing the reasonableness of risk
inherent to the van design including utility, purpose, price, size, attrac-
tiveness, and type of vehicle. 41 The court further provided that, in a
crashworthiness case it is necessary to consider the circumstances of the
accident itself.42 Taking these factors into account, the court found the
manufacturer had not breached its duty of ordinary care in its design of the
vehicle. 43
In this instance the court held that the manufacturer owed no duty to the
plaintiff. Were certain factors more favorable to the plaintiff, the most
important perhaps being the speed of impact, 44 a closer case would have
been presented. 45 In such an instance, the court must determine whether
issues of duty, causation, or apportionment proofs will be the basis of its
decision in finding or rejecting liability. Regardless of the result of its
decision, however, in order to provide useful guidance to manufacturers
and officers of the court, the basis should be clearly articulated.
Washington's common law test for product defect cases creates a con-
sumer-oriented standard based on the reasonable expectations of the ordi-
nary user of a product. 46 In determining whether a product's level of safety
meets the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a trier of fact
must consider, along with the intrinsic nature of the product, a number of
factors including the relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential
harm from the claimed defect, and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk.47
40. Id. at 1071-72 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
41. Id. at 1071-76.
42. Id. at 1073. Although the court referred to "circumstances" as another factor to be utilized in
weighing what constitutes an unreasonable risk, circumstances are more properly considered not as a
risk factor, but as a limit on foreseeability, or as a defense to the claim. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 26, §§ 42-3, at 272-301.
43. 489 F.2d at 1073.
44. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 494,497-98(1981) (noting that plaintiffs are generally successful in
proving enhanced injuries where the injured party's vehicle was moving at 35 miles per hour or less at
the time of the accident). See also Annot., 42 A.L.R. 3d 560 (1972).
45. See supra note 44. See also infra text accompanying notes 50-51.
46. E.g., Wagner v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wn. App. 558, 643 P.2d 906 (1982).
47. E.g., Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wn. 2d 345, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979).
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The Products Liability Statute48 also bases liability on products which
are not "reasonably safe." The statute's definition of "reasonably safe"
varies, depending upon whether the alleged defect arises from the design,
warnings, instructions, construction, or warranty of the item.
49
Applying common law standards in a case very similar to Dreisonstok,
the Washington Supreme Court found an importer liable for damages
sustained by the plaintiffs when their Volkswagen microbus collided with
the rear of another vehicle at twenty miles per hour.50 The court found that
improper design of the frontal area caused their deaths, but cautioned that
"[t]he purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably expect the same
degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expensive Ca-
dillac. . . . [W]e are dealing with a relative, not an absolute concept." 5'
In this instance the Washington court found the manufacturer's breach of
duty to be the proximate cause of the injury. Beyond this, however, little is
clear. Although the court labels the claim as one for enhanced injury,52 the
court does not discuss levels of enhancement or apportionment. This lack
of discussion could result only if the court neglected or overlooked this
important issue or, in the alternative, found the entire injury to be due to the
defective design-in which case, by definition, no enhanced injury exists.
Such a casual treatment of terminology can only add confusion to the
development of enhanced injury doctrine, and should be avoided. Once a
court resolves duty and proximate cause53 issues in favor of the plaintiff,
and thus determines that the defendant's design has caused some damage, it
must then focus on the more problematic area of enhanced injury claims-
apportionment.
B. Apportionment of the Injury: Enhanced Injury Underpinnings and
Historical Judicial Treatment
1. Enhanced Injury Underpinnings
In an enhanced injury negligence case, the claimant has the burden of
proving each of the following three elements by a preponderance of the
48. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.72 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 14-22.
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030 (1985).
50. Seattle-Frst Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975), aff'g, Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Volkswagen of America, 11 Wn. App. 929, 525 P.2d 286 (1974).
51. Tabert, 86 Wn. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
52. Id. at 150, 542 P.2d at 776.
53. The problems of duty and proximate cause are common to all tort actions. See supra notes
25-29 and accompanying text.
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evidence: 54 (1) a breach of a duty owed to the claimant;55 (2) that the breach
proximately caused an enhancement of damage over and above that which
would otherwise have occurred; 56 and (3) the extent to which the damage
was enhanced as a result of the breach of duty.57
It is the third element, apportionment, which has been controversial.
This is, in part, due to attempts to apply existing legal concepts to new
problems. Established tort concepts such as joint tortfeasor liability, 58
concerted action, 59 common duty,60 and vicarious liability6' are, however,
quite different from the concept of enhanced injury. Each involves the
infliction of an injury for which all actors may be held completely liable
because of their direct, active conduct.62
The law of successive tortfeasors, although more similar to the enhanced
injury than other traditional tort doctrines is, nonetheless, inapplicable to
the enhanced injury concept. Under successive tortfeasor law, when suc-
cessive acts of independent tortfeasors produce a single harm that is
unrelated in time or causation, the tortfeasors must try to disprove their
responsibility for the injury. Although each defendant is responsible only
for the portion of the injury that each caused, the burden of allocating that
causation is placed on the defendants. 63 If the defendants fail in this burden,
54. See Harris, Enhanced Injury Theory:An Analytic Framework, 62 N.C.L. REv. 643 (1984) (a
comprehensive treatment of enhanced injury claims and associated elements). See also supra note 6.
55. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981) (applying New York
law); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). See supra text accompanying
notes 30-53 (Part ILA).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Joint tortfeasors include all those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, further it by cooperation or request, lend aid or encouragement to
the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts done for their benefit. Any joint tortfeasor may
be required to pay the full amount of the plaintiffs' damages. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 26,
§ 46. See also infra note I 11.
59. Concerted action arises when two or more persons act in unison. In legal contemplation, there
is a joint enterprise and a mutual agency so that the act of one is the act of all, and liability for all that is
done is visited upon each. W. PROSSER & W. KEErON, supra note 26, § 52.
60. Common duty denotes a number of defendants who may be under a similar duty to exercise care
to prevent a particular occurence. Id.
61. The liability of a master for the acts of a servant or agent is known as vicarious liability. Id.
62. These doctrines fail to recognize that the underlying basis of the claim for enhanced injury is
not direct, but passive. Thus, imposing joint and several liability for enhanced injuries disregards the
theoretical underpinnings of the claim, which only exacts liability for those injuries due to the
enhancing defect. In Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976),
the court noted these shortcomings: "The negligent driver of the other car was a joint tortfeasor with
Ford. ... However, the court determined Ford should not be considered a joint tortfeasor with
respect to all damages: "It is only the enhanced injuries for which Ford may be held liable." Id. at 268.
See also supra text accompanying notes 104-18.
63. E.g., Phennah v. Whalen, 28 Wn. App. 19,621 P.2d 1304 (1980). The burden of apportionment
issue is closely allied with the alternative liability of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948),
which held that where it is impossible to determine which of the defendants' negligence was the actual
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they may be held jointly and severally liable.64
Enhanced injury differs from the concept of successive tortfeasors in that
the manufacturer is never the cause of, nor legally accountable for, the
entire injury.65 The manufacturer is liable for that portion of the injury over
and above that which the initial accident would have caused if the product
had been reasonably safe. 66 The issue of which party should bear this
burden of apportionment has raised great controversy and diversity be-
tween the courts and commentators.
2. Historical Judicial Treatment in the Enhanced Injury Context
It was not until relatively recently that the courts recognized claims for
enhanced injury.67 Since that time, courts and counsel have struggled with
issues related to the burden of apportionment, often rendering inequitable
results and confusing doctrine.
In the landmark case of Larsen v. General Motors Corp.68 the Eighth
Circuit held a manufacturer liable for aggravated injuries sustained in a
second collision as a result of a negligently defective design. Most courts,
69
including those of Washington, 70 have adopted the reasoning of Larsen.
Larsen found that although the manufacturer was liable for injuries
caused by the defective design, it should be liable only for that portion of
cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the burden of going forward shifts to each defendant to show their
negligence was not the actual cause. See also Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wn. App. 599, 602 n.5, 557
P.2d 1324, 1326 n.5 (1976) (citing Summers and Madigan v. Teague, 55 Wn. 2d 498, 348 P.2d 403
(1960), suggesting that plaintiff's evidence must show the impossibility of segregating the damages
before shifting the burden to the defendants).
64. See supra note 63. See also supra note 8.
65. The fact that proof of enhancement is a necessary element of the enhanced injury case requiring
affirmative proof is similar to the evaluation made in Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 85 N.H.
449, 163 A. Ill (1932). There, a boy sitting on a bridge lost his balance and fell off. The court assumed
he was substantially certain to be killed or seriously injured even if the defendant had not been negligent
in its placement of electrical wires. Because the fall was completed before the defendant's negligence
caused any harm, the court allowed damages against the defendant for only the additional impairment of
life or health, if any, attributable to the defendant. The same principle must apply in an enhanced injury
case; in order to assess the liability of the manufacturer there must be a causal apportionment.
For further discussion, see infra notes 123-31 and accompanying text (Part HI.B).
66. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F2d 726, 738 (3rd Cir. 1976) ("Clearly, if the theoretical
underpinnings for liability. . . are to be given effect, [the party causing the accident] may be held
liable for all injuries, but [the manufacturer] may only be held liable for 'enhanced injuries."')
(emphasis in original). See also infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
67. Although earlier cases may be found, enhanced injury claims were not fully recognized until
the 1970's, in cases interpreting Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
68. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968) (negligence action, applying Michigan law).
69. See Ropiequet, Current Issues under the "Second Collision" Doctrine, reprinted in FoR THE
DEFENSE 14, 20 (Oct. 1983) (listing 35 states and the District of Columbia as having expressly followed
Larsen).
70. E.g., Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 751, 522 P.2d 829 (1974).
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the injury over and above that which would probably have occurred absent
the defective design. 71 In effect, this holding excludes the possibility of
finding the manufacturer jointly and severally liable with other defendants
for all of the damages except, perhaps, in the rare case where the defective
design can be shown to have caused all of the plaintiff's injury.
The Larsen court did not indicate which of the parties has the burden of
apportioning the damages. 72 However, subsequent cases interpreting
Larsen- the Fifth Circuit in Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co.,73 and the
Third Circuit in Huddell v. Levin 74 -- held the burden of proving the proper
apportionment of damages rests upon the plaintiff.
In Higginbotham, the plaintiff's 1970 Ford Maverick collided head-on
with another automobile. The force of impact bent the left frame rail of the
Maverick, rotating the engine compartment into the front seat, injuring
Higginbotham and killing his wife.75 The court held for the defendant,
implying that if the plaintiff does not prove the extent of the aggravated
injuries in the second collision, the manufacturer will escape liability for
defective design. The court did not discuss, and perhaps overlooked the fact
that in many cases it will be impossible to apportion damages.
In Huddell v. Levin, 76 the driver suffered fatal brain damage when his car
was rear-ended, thrusting his head against an allegedly defective headrest.
The Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiff's expert witnesses had provided
sufficient evidence regarding the head restraint to justify submitting to the
jury the issues of whether the head restraint was defectively designed and
had proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. However, the court held
that the plaintiff must prove three additional elements in order to establish
the manufacturer's liability in the enhanced injury context. First, in order to
demonstrate defective design, the plaintiff must offer proof of an alter-
native, safer design practicable under the circumstances. 77 Second, the
plaintiff must prove what injuries, if any, would have resulted had the
manufacturer used the alternative, safer design. 78 Finally, as a corollary to
71. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
72. The court merely stated:
The manufacturer argues that [the proper allocation] is difficult to assess. This is no persuasive
answer and, even if difficult, there is no reason to abandon the injured party to his dismal fate as a
traffic statistic, when the manufaturer owed, at least, a common law duty of reasonable care in the
design and construction of its product. The obstacles of apportionment are not insurmountable.
Id.
73. 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976) (strict liability, applying Georgia law; inconsistent jury findings as
to proximate cause required retrial).
74. 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976) (strict liability, applying New Jersey law).
75. Higginbotham, 540 F.2d at 765-66.
76. 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
77. Id. at 737-38.
78. Id. at 737.
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the second aspect of proof, the plaintiff must offer some method of
establishing the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective
design. 79 The plaintiff's experts had testified "unequivocably" that Dr.
Huddell would have survived the accident in a properly designed car, but
the court demanded medical evidence of the precise injuries Dr. Huddell
would have received had he survived with a headrest of different design.
Although the Huddell court held that the plaintiff must prove the proper
apportionment of injuries, 80 there is no indication that.the court, as a matter
of policy, desired to prohibit recovery unless such an apportionment could
be established. However, Huddell assumes that the enhanced injuries in a
second collision will be factually separable from other "normal" injuries
typically sustained in an accident. Many times this will not prove correct.
For instance, with brain injuries such as those sustained by Dr. Huddell, the
plaintiff would, in essence, have to demonstrate the threshold energies
below which the decedent would not have been injured or, conversely, what
effects the higher energy impact would have had on the brain given a
reasonably safe design. 81 In operation, this onerous burden82 may resolve
against the injured litigant not only those cases where apportionment is
impossible, but also many cases where apportionment proof is pro-
hibitively expensive.
A minority of other courts have rejected this rigid requirement primarily
on public policy grounds. In Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 83 the Tenth Circuit
placed the burden on the defendant to prove the amount of enhancement. 84
In Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, AG, 85 the Eighth Circuit followed the Fox
policy so as not to "[relegate] victims to an almost hopeless state of never
being able to succeed." 86
These cases recognize that once plaintiffs establish proof of wrong, they
should be allowed a recovery, and the fact that the jury must decide
uncertain quantities should not, by itself, prohibit recovery. These courts
analogize to other areas of law where courts have recognized that once the
"fact" of wrongful damage has been established, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover even if the amount is not susceptible to exact proof.87 For instance,
79. Id. at 738.
80. The court does little more than acknowledge that this burden may be "difficult." Id. at 737,
743.
81. See id. at 737-38.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 126-31.
83. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978) (applying Wyoming law).
84. Id. at 787.
85. 669 F2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying Minnesota law).
86. Id. at 1204.
87. See, e.g., Wenzler & Ward Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Sellen, 53 W.2d 96, 330 P.2d 1068
(1958) (contract damages). Examples of analogous areas include antitrust and defamation.
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in May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 88 the court candidly recognized that en-
hanced injury cases produce inexact situations that cannot be translated
into mathematically precise awards:
There is no way of determining, of course, what the exact extent of plaintiff's
injuries would have been had the roll bar not collapsed. However, we allow
juries to make somewhat similar inexact determinations, such as the extent of
pain and suffering and its value in money. We do so because we believe such
pain and suffering should be compensable, and there is no way of determining
its extent and value other than to allow the jury to use its best judgment. The
only alternative in this case is to say that plaintiff probably was additionally
injured by the collapse of the bar, but that, because we cannot determine
exactly what his injuries would have been if it had not collapsed, he cannot
recover at all. This is not an acceptable alternative, and it is usual to allow the
jury to use its judgment in similar inexact situations. 89
The difference between the apportionment issue approaches of the
courts in the Huddell and Mitchell cases may reflect differences in underly-
ing policies endorsed by the respective courts. 90 However, the practical
significance of these differences is perhaps unimportant in most cases. The
majority of courts, while placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff, have
mitigated its effects by finding the plaintiff's burden of proving apportion-
ment satisfied so long as there is some fixed 9' estimate of injury enhance-
ment introduced. Hence, in practical effect, many cases negate the Huddell
requirement by permitting only rough estimates, and in some cases allow-
ing superficial allegations relating to the extent of enhancement as suffi-
cient to meet the burden. 92 This reluctance to deny the injured plaintiff a
88. 265 Or. 307, 309-10, 509 P.2d 24, 26-27 (1973).
S9. Id. at 309-10, 509 P.2d at 26-27.
90. Such differences include whether the jurisdictions endorse strict liability or traditional fault-
based approaches to products liability actions. See, e.g., Note, Second Collision Liability:A Critique of
Two Approaches to Plaintiff's Burden of Proof 68 IowA L. REv. 811 (1983). See infra note 146.
91. In general, courts since Huddell have been quick to find the plaintiff's burden of apportionment
satisfied as long as some "credible" evidence is admitted relevant to the issue. This has resulted in many
technically dubious, even ludicrous, "expert" opinions. See infra note 92. From a physical/engineering
standpoint, it is impossible to calculate force magnitudes occurring in accident situations with the
precision claimed in most cases, see supra note 38, suggesting that it may be easier to bypass the
Huddell apportionment problems by simply postulating a figure, regardless of its scientific accuracy.
The ethical considerations related to such a decision are beyond the scope of this Comment.
92. A few cases may illustrate this point:
In Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976), the court
held the evidence sufficient to establish that injuries suffered when the motorist's face struck three
prongs on the horn assembly after the horn cap had come off were greater than would have occurred had
the horn cap remained in place. The motorist's expert testified that the force with which she struck the
prongs was 100 times greater than the force with which she would have struck the surface of the horn
cap. The defendant automobile manufacturer presented evidence that the force of the collision was such
that the motorist would have broken her jaw even if the horn cap had been in place and argued that,
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recovery suggests that other unarticulated factors bearing on the question of
which party should carry the burden of proof of apportionment may be
important to the courts in placing such a burden.
III. USEFUL GUIDELINES AND POLICIES IN PLACING THE
BURDEN OF APPORTIONMENT
Commentators have suggested many sources upon which courts might
draw in resolving the issue of which party should carry the burden of
therefore, the defect actually caused no injury. Noting that the jury had an opportunity fo observe the
exposed prongs and could reasonably have inferred from such observation that more damage would be
done to a face striking the prongs than to a face striking the horn cap, the court concluded that the jury
was warranted in finding that the exposed prongs enhanced the motorist's injuries. It added that the
jurors were entirely free to reject the manufacturer's evidence to the contrary. 17 Cal. 3d at 369, 551 P.2d
at 402.
In Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976), plaintiff's
expert testified that the absence of a head restraint exposed the occupant of the pickup truck in a low
speed rear-end collision to a cranial impact some 16 times greater than that which would have occurred
with a head restraint. In responding to defendant's attack upon the sufficiency of the proof of causal
connection between the defect and the enhanced injury, the court stated: "The jury was certainly
entitled to infer that if the magnitude of the impact had been reduced to 1/16 of that experienced by
plaintiff, even a person of his susceptibility would not have been injured or, in any event, the degree of
his injury would have been substantially reduced." Id. at 540, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
In Stahl v. Ford Motor Co., 64 II1. App. 3d 919, 381 N.E.2d 1211 (1978), involving a defectively
designed seatbelt, the court pointed to evidence indicating that the kinetic energy of an unrestrained
moving body is five times greater than that of a restrained moving body, hence increasing the energy to
be absorbed on impact. Expert witnesses had testified that it was very probable that the motorist's
injuries were five times greater than they would have been had he been restrained. Affirming ajudgment
for the motorist, the court ackiowledged that the plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient
evidence so that the jury may apportion damages between the original injury and the aggravation of that
injury. The court concluded, however, that the motorist had satisfied this burden in the present case.
In Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Wisconsin law), the court held
that there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to whether a defect in the design of the fuel
tank in the plaintiff's vehicle was the cause of the plaintiff's burns. In rejecting the manufacturer's
contention that the plaintiff had presented no credible evidence to support the finding that the defect was
a cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the court pointed out that the plaintiff's expert described the defects he
found, gave an opinion that the defect was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries, and
explained how the defective portions of the fuel tank system failed, allowing the fire to spread into the
passenger compartment. Noting that the manufacturer produced expert testimony that no design would
have withstood an impact of similar force and argued that no opposing testimony was couched in similar
terms, the court declared that expert testimony framed in the particular terms suggested by the
manufacturer was not essential to making out a case.
In Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973), overruled on other grounds,
Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155 (1979), the court affirmed a judgment for the representative of a
decedent who was killed when the car he was driving overturned and, due to an allegedly defective seat
belt, he was thrown from the vehicle. The evidence showed that the driver's compartment of the vehicle
had remained essentially intact in the accident. A professor of physics testified that this absence of
internal damage to the vehicle indicated that the fatal injury occurred outside of the car and that had the
seat belt remained intact and the decedent remained inside the car, the extent of the injury would have
been minor.
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apportionment in the enhanced injury context. 93 Such sources include
established tort doctrines and policy considerations.
When examining these sources in light of the enhanced injury situation,
many aspects of the claim may present unique limits on the usefulness of
their application. First, proof of the amount of enhancement may often be
difficult or expensive, 94 so that placement of the burden may be outcome
determinative. 95 Second, since the theoretical foundation for the claim is
the enhancement of injuries ,96 the manufacturer should be responsible only
for that portion of the injuries attributable to the defective design. While
these aspects of the claim seem relatively simple, they may conflict when
applied within existing doctrines, particularly when accommodation of
other goals and policies is desirable. 97
A. Tort Doctrines
General tort rules, concurrent liability doctrines, and the Restatement
provide the three standard sources one might use when formulating treat-
ment of apportionment issues in the enhanced injury context. These
sources, while perhaps not directly applicable, may nevertheless provide
useful insight.
1. General Tort Rules
Tort principles generally place the burden upon plaintiffs to prove
damages which are not speculative. 98 Since the manufacturer is ana-
lytically liable for only a portion of the injuries in the enhanced injury
context, 99 if the burden of allocation is placed with the plaintiff, the
defendant manufacturer will generally argue that the plaintiff has failed to
adequately demonstrate causally related damages. 00 This argument has
93. See, e.g., Comment, Second Collision Liability in New York: Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 47 ALB. L. REV. 560 (1983).
94. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
95. See id.
96. See supra notes 65-66.
97. See infra notes 123-31 and accompanying text (Part III.B).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965); e.g., Scott v. Rainbow Ambulance Serv.,
Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 494, 452 P.2d 220 (1969).
99. The manufacturer is further protected by the Tort Reform Act of 1981, WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 4.22.005-.925 (1985), which extends comparative principles, including contributory fault, to all
tort actions regardless of their effect under prior law. See WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON TORT & PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 1, at 46-47 (Jan. 1981). See also Klein v.
R.D. Werner Co., 98 Wn. 2d 316, 654 P.2d 94 (1982) (Tort Reform Act appears to mandate that
contributory negligence now applies to actions based upon strict product liability).
100. E.g., Olympia Oyster Co. v. Rayonier, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 855, 861 (W.D. Wash. 1964)
("Washington law demands that ... every plaintiff claiming damages has the burden of proof to
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been successful in many instances. Indeed, Huddell explicitly adhered to
this position without examining the practical considerations which might
weigh against imposing such a burden.
The plaintiff normally bears the burden of proving damages because it is
a necessary element of the cause of action. 0 1 More fundamentally, the
justification generally espoused is that under our adversary system some-
one must lose. The risk of nonpersuasion, called the burden of proof, is
uniformly placed upon the plaintiff because it is that party which is asking
the court for relief. 102
The issue of damages should not, however, be directly equated with the
concept of apportionment. In many instances the plaintiff can demonstrate
total damages, This is generally all the law requires. When indivisible
damages are attributable to multiple tortfeasors, for instance, courts gener-
ally hold defendants liable for the total loss, regardless of culpability, 10 3
leaving the defendants to determine among themselves the proper appor-
tionment. Hence, while the "general tort doctrine rule" appears super-
ficially appealing, it does not support placing the burden of apportionment
on the plaintiff.
2. Concurrent Liability Doctrines
Existing doctrines applicable to cases involving joint or concurrent
tortfeasors provide another source upon which to base apportionment
guidelines in the enhanced injury context. 104 These doctrines generally
place the burden of apportionment on the defendants, 05 particularly if the
harm is indivisible. This result is founded on the premise that the court must
make a choice as to where the loss due to a failure of proof will fall. The
choice between an innocent plaintiff and defendants whose fault has been
clearly proven is generally felt to balance in favor of placing risks in failures
of proof upon the latter. 106
Three factors typically affect the rules of apportionment in cases involv-
ing joint tortfeasors: (1) the relationship between the tortfeasors; (2) the
present sufficient evidence from which damages can be determined on some rational basis and other
than by pure speculation and conjecture.").
101. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEaTON, supra note 26, § 30 (negligence).
102. Id. at § 38.
103. Id. at § 52. It should also be noted that the Washington Liability Reform Act of 1986,
E.S.S.B. 4630,49th Leg. Reg. Sess., retains joint and several liability forclaims involving indivisible
harm, and only "repeals" joint and several liability when the harm is divisible, the defendants were not
acting in concert, and the plaintiff is partially at fault. See supra note 8.
104. For further discussion, see Comment, Apportionment ofDamages in the "Second Collision"
Case, 63 VA. L. REv. 475, 492-97 (1977).
105. W. PROssER & W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 52. See also supra note 103.
106. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 52.
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divisibility of the injury; and (3) the contribution of each to the injury. ) 07 In
turn, these factors would be expected to affect the burden of apportionment
in three different instances, including where each tortfeasor's act alone: (1)
would not have caused any injury to the plaintiff but for its concurrence
with the other tortfeasors' actions; (2) could have caused the entire injury;
or (3) would have caused part, but not all, of the injury. 108
In the first instance, where a concurrence of action causes injury, joint
and several liability is imposed because each tortfeasor is responsible for
causing the entire indivisible injury. This is because no injury would have
occurred but for the concurrence of both or all of the actions. 109 Courts
allowing total recovery from an accident-causing driver follow this doc-
trine. 10 However, in many automobile accidents the occupants suffer not
only enhanced injuries, but injuries which would have occurred even in a
properly designed automobile. In such cases, application of concurrent
tortfeasor decisions' would make the manufacturer a joint tortfeasor and
unfairly impose total liability on the manufacturer where the basis of the
claim is the enhancement of injury. 112
In the second instance, each independent tortfeasor alone could have
caused the entire indivisible injury. This situation never arises in an
enhanced injury case. The defective design alone does not cause any injury.
The first collision, which is attributable to another cause, must occur before
the design can injure the plaintiff in the "second collision." Without the
first accident, the defect would not produce any injury. The apportionment
rules from cases falling within this category are therefore distinguishable,
and provide little logical basis upon which to assess the enhanced injury
claim.
The third instance, in which the actor causes part but not all of the injury,
is also distinguishable from the enhanced injury case. The manufacturer's
defect does not actively and directly cause the plaintiff's injury; the first
collision must intervene before the design can cause any injury. Thus, the
107. See, e.g., Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wn. App. 599, 557 P.2d 1324 (1976); Doyle, Multiple
Causes and Apportionment of Damages, 43 DEN. L.J. 490 (1966).
108. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 26, ch. 8; Doyle, supra note 107;
Comment, supra note 104.
109. See Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wn. App. 599, 601-02, 557 P.2d 1324, 1325-26 (1976). See
also infra note Ill.
110. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976).
111. The rule of concurrent liability provides that where the separate wrongful acts of two
defendants concur, and it appears that the plaintiff would not have been injured but for the concurrence,
then both of the defendants are liable. This is inconsistent with the enhanced injury claim which holds
the manufacturer liable only for his contribution to the injury. The application of concurrent liability to
enhanced injury becomes even more inequitable where the non-manufacturer defendant proves insol-
vent.
112. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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direct, active, and unaided conduct which justifies imposing joint and
several liability on each defendant in the first and second factual situations,
and in the third situation if apportionment is not reasonably possible, 13 is
absent in the enhanced injury case. Furthermore, because concurrent
tortfeasor decisions assign the burden of allocation to the plaintiff when
apportionment is "reasonably" possible in the third situation, 114 applica-
tion of those principles might adversely affect the ability of the plaintiff to
recover for his injuries in some instances, particularly where such proof is
difficult or expensive. 115
The joint and concurrent tortfeasor rules fail to provide satisfactory
results for apportionment of damages in the enhanced injury context
because they do not, and cannot, adequately address concerns fundamental
to the enhanced injury claim itself. The successive tortfeasor situation 116
most closely parallels the enhanced injury context because multiple defen-
dants each cause separate, although perhaps indivisible, damage. 117 Here,
the imposition of joint and several liability suggests that public policy
might favor placing the burden of apportionment upon the defendant when
it is not clear which "collision" was the cause of the damage in question.118
3. The Restatement of Torts
The Restatement also provides insight into the issue of apportionment.
Section 433A of the Restatement requires apportionment only when the
plaintiff's various injuries are distinct or when a "reasonable basis" exists
for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.119 In other
113. See Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wn. App. 599, 602 n.5, 557 P.2d 1324, 1326 n.5 (1976).
114. Id.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 126-31; see also supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
116. See, e.g., Phennah v. Whalen, 28 Wn. App. 19, 621 P.2d 1304 (1980). See also supra text
accompanying notes 63-64.
117. It is important to note that there are situations in which the earlier wrongdoer will be liable for
the entire damage, but the later one will not. If an automobile negligently driven by defendant A strikes
the plaintiff, causing a skull fracture, and leaves the plaintiff helpless on the highway, where shortly
afterward a second automobile, negligently driven by defendant B, runs over the plaintiff and breaks a
leg, A will be liable for both injuries. This is because when the plaintiff was left in the highway, it was
reasonably to be anticipated that a second car would run the plaintiff down. But defendant B should be
liable only for the broken leg, since B had no part in causing the fractured skull, and could not foresee or
avoid it. On the same basis, an original wrongdoer may be liable for the additional harm inflicted by the
negligent treatment of the victim by a physician, but the physician will not be liable for the original
injury. W. PROSSER & W. K.EMoN, supra note 26, § 52, at 352.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38. See also supra notes 8, 103.
119. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF TORrs § 433A (1965). Apportionment of Harm to Causes:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where (a) there are distinct
harms, or (b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more causes.
589
Washington Law Review
cases the trier of fact may not apportion damages. 120 Section 433B provides
that in multiple causation cases the defendants must bear the burden of
proving the proper allocation of damages. 121
Thus, the Restatement never allocates the burden of apportionment to the
plaintiff. Although this approach holds the manufacturer liable when
apportionment is not feasible, the Restatement justifies this result by
allowing the manufacturer to limit its liability through apportionment
proofs and by recognizing that apportionment is only in issue after the
plaintiff has already proved the manufacturers' design has caused some
harm. 122
B. Policy Considerations
Courts have drawn on a variety of tort doctrines in resolving enhanced
injury claims. 123 Often, however, these doctrines only imperfectly parallel
the concepts or issues involved, or render inequitable or inconsistent
results. Consequently, courts should, and often do, look to underlying
policies and social implications of their decisions, particularly when novel
claims or issues are presented. The enhanced injury apportionment issue
represents such an instance.
The present state of products liability law reflects society's desire to
compensate an accident victim for injuries attributable to defective design
or due to concomitants associated with activities or products society deems
too important to prohibit. The courts, in dealing with enhanced injury, have
uniformly held that the plaintiff should bear the initial burden of proving
defectiveness, safer alternatives, and the aggravation of injuries due to the
defect(s). 124 A lighter burden would tend to place the manufacturer in a
position similar to that of an insurer. 125 However, once the plaintiff
120. Id.
121. Id. at § 433B. Burden of Proof:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about harm to the
plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable
of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to
the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is
upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.
122. Hence, the plaintiff need not show the exact amount of the defendant's contribution, but
rather, that there was, in fact, some contribution. The defendant need not pay all damages, but only
those damages for which the plaintiff's quantifications cannot be rebutted. See id. § 433B and related
comments. See also infra note 147.
123. See supra notes 98-122 and accompanying text (Part III.A).
124. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976).
125. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495,502-03 (8th Cir. 1968); Comment, supra
note 25, at 116. See also infra text accompanying note 132 (Part III.B.2).
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adequately demonstrates these three factors, causation exists, and the court
should require the manufacturer to account for the contribution to the
plaintiff's injuries. Apportionment policies should focus upon whether the
manufacturer should avoid all liability when the plaintiff cannot apportion
or sufficiently isolate the damage occasioned by the faulty desigh.
1. Difficulty of Proof
The difficulty of proving a given issue will often be considered by courts
when allocating the burden of proof on that issue. 126 As in many products
liability cases, in the enhanced injury context the manufacturer knows or
can learn far more about essential aspects of the product than the injured
litigant. Automobile manufacturers, in particular, have an even greater
advantage over the plaintiff. They command impressive resources, includ-
ing vast testing facilities and top engineers skilled in, among other things,
accident reconstruction and safety analysis. Moreover, many of these skills
and tests are utilized to meet required governmental safety regulations and
certifications. Hence, much existing data may be available to the manufac-
turer which is specific to the type of vehicle involved in the litigation.
In addition, the physical, medical, and engineering aspects of an auto-
mobile accident are extremely complex. Even if one could determine the
exact response of an automobile in a particular accident pattern, the
resulting medical implications would be as variable and unique as the
individual involved. 127 Thus, if any "quantification" is made, it is unlikely
126. Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Phennah v. Whalen, 28 Wn.App. 19,621
P.2d 1304 (1980).
Culpability may also influence allocation of the burden of proof. E.g., Scott v. Rainbow Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 494, 452 P.2d 220 (1969):
We are concerned with a single injury, one claimed tort-feasor and a plaintiff who apparently
contributed to the single injury through her own fault. . . . This material fault of the plaintiff,
contributing substantially to the single injury, removes this case from that field of lawsuits where
the legal principles applied were appropriate to the situation of an innocent plaintiff faced with
multiple wrongdoers. There is a tendency in the latter cases to relax the usual rule that the burden
of proof as to causation is upon the plaintiff. . . . [I]t is unfair to deny an innocent person redress
simply because he cannot prove how much of the damage each tort-feasor caused, when it is
certain that between them they caused it all. ...
When the facts of the case are such that plaintiff is clearly one of the two persons responsible for
the injury involved, and plaintiff makes no attempt to segregate those damages, we find no over-
riding reason in justice for shifting that burden of proof to the defendants.
Id. at 497-98, 452 P.2d at 221-22.
But see D. NOEL & J. PHn.Lips, PRoDucrs LT ALrrv 673-74 (1976) (concluding that courts rarely
admit shifting the burden of proof to defendants in products liability cases, but instead relax the burden
initially placed on the plaintiff and thereby effectively shift it to the defendant).
127. Indeed, "what might have happened is rarely susceptible of proof." Caiazzo v. Volkswagen-
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to be accurate except within very wide limits, 128 rendering such estimates
little better than speculation in many instances. 129
These facts, when combined with the fact that apportionment is appro-
priate only after the plaintiff has proved the manufacturer was in some way
responsible for causing or aggravating the plaintiff's injuries, suggest that
manufacturers more capable of proving apportionment should not escape
liability merely because the plaintiff cannot establish the "correct" appor-
tionment. 130 This is in accord with the Restatement, which bases its
position on the underlying premise that between proved tortfeasors who
have clearly caused some harm, and the entirely innocent plaintiff, any
hardship due to lack of evidence as to the extent of harm caused should fall
upon the former. 131
2. Societal Implications
Other interests of society are also important in shaping the court's policy.
Liability is imposed upon manufacturers in the hope that it will promote the
design of safer products and thereby afford consumers the maximum
protection from hazardous designs. 132 If the injured litigant bears the
burden of apportioning damages, especially when apportionment is impos-
sible, many parties will be denied compensation for their causally-related
injuries, and the manufacturer who thereby escapes liability will have less
incentive to develop safer products.
On the other hand, the imposition of excessive liability on the manufac-
turer may also conflict with the public interest. Manufacturers will pass the
costs of liability and of designing safer products on to consumers, in the
form of higher prices. These higher prices are only justified to the extent
that they reflect design modifications reasonably necessary to promote
safety. If the apportionment rules in operation make manufacturers liable
for injuries not actually caused by defective designs but instead due to
burdens of proof or presumptions that heavily favor the plaintiff, all
consumers in effect become insurers for injuries sometimes attributable not
to the manufacturer, but to the product users.
werk A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 468 F. Supp.
593, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
128. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
129. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
130. But see D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, supra note 126.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 433B comment d (1965). See alsosupra text accompany-
ing notes 119-22.
132. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966).
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This imposition of additional liability may occur in two ways. First, the
added burden of proof regarding apportionment may significantly increase
the manufacturers' costs associated with enhanced injury litigation. Sec-
ond, fear of excessive liability, when coupled with the uncertain standard of
"reasonably safe," may cause the manufacturer to "overdesign" products
to the extent that the increased costs are no longer justified by the small
increases in safety. This may be unfair to both manufacturers and consum-
ers. It may be unfair to manufacturers in that they may be sacrificing
competitiveness in the market and profits for increased litigation costs and
unwarranted design changes. It may be unfair to the consumers because
they may bear increased design costs without gaining corresponding bene-
fits in safety. In the net analysis, society has competing interests: imposing
the burden of apportionment on the manufacturer would promote safer
design, but would also likely increase product prices.
IV. WASHINGTON CONSIDERATIONS
Washington products liability decisions have always taken an expansive
view of the manufacturer's liability and often look to the Restatement for
guidance. 133 As previously discussed, 3 4 the Restatement would never
allocate the burden of apportionment to the plaintiff. 135
Placing the burden of apportionment on the defendant would also seem
consistent with Washington's treatment of successive tortfeasors. While the
two situations are not completely analogous, Washington's treatment of
successive tortfeasors indicates a policy of placing the burden upon defen-
dants where uncertainties in apportionment exist. 136 For instance, in Phen-
nah v. Whalen, 137 the plaintiff was involved in two auto accidents within
several months. In a suit against both drivers, the court held each jointly
and severally liable. The court determined the issue of joint liability on the
basis of the resulting injury rather than on any characterization of the
tortfeasors as joint or concurrent. It went on to conclude that because of the
indivisibility of the injury, each defendant should be entirely liable. 138
133. See, e.g., Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d 522,452 P.2d 729 (1964); Padronv. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 34 Wn. App. 473, 662 P.2d 67 (1983); Note, Products Liability Covers Second
Collision, 10 GoNz. L. REv. 211 (1974).
134. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
135. The Restatement's view is that any hardship associated with burden of apportionment should
rest with the defendants. See also supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. See also infra text accompanying notes 116-18. It
should be noted that the Washington Liability Reform Act of 1986, E.S.S.B. 4630, 49th Leg., Reg.
Sess., should not change this analysis. See supra notes 8, 103.
137. 28 Wn. App. 19, 621 P.2d 1304 (1980).
138. Id. at 29, 621 P.2d at 1310.
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Washington courts have also given expansive treatment to the doctrine of
joint and several liability. Injured parties may sue one or all joint or
concurrent tortfeasors and obtain a full recovery from any one of them
without regard to the relative degree of damage caused by each. 13 9 The
courts have rejected arguments to the contrary, noting that what is equitable
between multiple tortfeasors is an issue totally divorced from what is fair to
injured plaintiffs. 140
The Tort Reform Act preserves joint and several liability. 141 This is
consistent with the Act's liability principles, which are based generally on
the concept that each actor should ultimately bear the proportion of the loss
caused by his or her conduct. In those instances where the actor cannot
respond in damages, such loss is born by the other defendants rather than
by the injured party. The Select Committee conceded that the effect of the
rule might be to require partially-at-fault defendants to pay more than their
share of the joint defendants' liability in certain cases. However, the
Committee felt that the creation of a right of contribution among tortfeasors
would ameliorate any resulting unfairness. In those cases where it did not,
the Select Committee felt that defendants rather than plaintiffs should bear
the burden of that unfairness. 142 To further dispel any remaining doubts that
the Committee desired defendants to bear any problems associated with
apportionment, it provided that where the claim or injury is indivisible with
139. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308
(1978); Litts v. Pierce County, 5 Wn. App. 531, 488 P.2d 785 (1971).
The Washington Liability Reform Act of 1986, E.S.S.B. 4630, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess., substantially
changes Washington law in this area. Under the 1986 Act, joint and several liability is repealed when the
plaintiff has contributed to the fault unless the harm is indivisible or the defendants are acting in concert.
See supra note 8.
140. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank at 235-36, 588 P.2d at 1312-13:
[Hiarm caused by both joint and concurrent tort-feasors [may be] indivisible. The distinguishing
factor between these types of tort-feasors is the duty breached. Joint tort-feasors breach ajoint duty
whereas concurrent tort-feasors breach separate duties ....
. . . [However,] we have long held that such tort-feasors are each liable for the entire harm
caused ....
[W]e can conceive of no reason for relieving that tort-feasor of his responsibility to make full
compensation for all harm he has caused the injured party. What may be equitable between
multiple tort-feasors is an issue totally divorced from what is fair to the injured party.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
See also Boeing Co. v. State, 89 Wn. 2d 443, 448, 572 P.2d 8, 12 (1978) ("[I]f two individuals
commit independent acts of negligence which concur to produce the proximate cause of an injury to a
third person . . . each is liable as if solely responsible for the injury.") But see supra note 139.
141. For a more complete discussion of this aspect of the Act, see Comment, Contribution Among
Tortfeasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort Reform Act, 57 WASH. L. REv. 479 (1982). But see supra notes
8, 103, 139.
142. See WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT AND PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM
FINAL REPORT 1 (Jan. 1981). But see supra note 139.
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respect to contribution, the "court may determine that two or more persons
are to be treated as a single person for purposes of contribution." 143
The statutory guidance contained in the preamble to the Product Lia-
bility Tort Reform Act of 1981144 provides further insight. The preamble
focuses on protecting industrial incentives to develop new products through
lower premiums for product liability insurance while seeking to lower
consumer costs without "unduly impair[ing]" consumer rights to recovery
for injuries sustained as the result of unsafe products. 145 Placing the burden
of apportioning damages on the defendant 'accomplishes these goals. 146
The plaintiff must first establish that the defective design enhanced the
injury above that which would have occurred with a safer design. Once the
wrong to the plaintiff has been established, the goal of not "unduly
impairing" the plaintiff's right to recovery requires that the burden shift to
the defendants. 147 This scheme allows the wrong to be redressed while
143. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1985). But see supra note 139.
144. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 7.72 (1985). This preamble was not modified by the Liability Reform
Act of 1986, E.S.S.B. 4630, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. See supra note 8.
145. For further discussion regarding history of the Act, see Talmadge, Washington's Product
Liability Act, 5 U. PuGEr SouND L. REv. 1 (1981).
146. One commentator has forcefully argued to the contrary-that the differences in approaches to
apportionment reflect varying court views and policies toward product liability claims. In this regard,
"Huddell reflects a traditional fault-based approach to products liability. Mitchell, on the other hand
• . . seems consistent with the trend toward. . . strict liability." See Note, supra note 90, at 830.
The above approach, when coupled with the fact that the Tort Reform Act of 1981 retreats from strict
liability standards to negligence-based standards for design defects, defective warnings, or defective
instructions, suggests that the Washington courts should not apply the expansive approach of Mitchell
(which places the apportionment burden on the defendant, consistent with strict liability and other
modem policy-oriented tort doctrines). Instead, courts should follow the Huddell approach (which
places the apportionment burden on the plaintiff, consistent with orthodox, fault-based tort doctrines)
so as to be consistent with the purposes and intent of the Act. Indeed, one Washington commentator has
noted that recent supreme court language in Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 W.2d 208,683 P.2d 1097
(1984), suggests that the Washington Supreme Court will recognize that the Act significantly changes
prior law, and will change its stance accordingly. See WASHINGTON STATE BAR Assoc., TORT AND
PRODucTs LtABmrr PtAcncE at 3-17 to 3-19 (r. McLaughlin 1984). The problem with this argument is
that it ignores that policy considerations are important in negligence analysis as well as strict liability
analysis. Regardless of the doctrine applied, if policy considerations are examined and weighed, the
Washington courts will likely follow the Mitchell approach.
147. Another positive feature of placing the burden of apportionment upon the defendants is that it
lends certainty to case preparation. Moreover, because manufacturers uniformly perform crash tests,
once it is clear that they will be required to quantify injury enhancement in litigation, they can
incorporate such data collection in existing test procedures.
Standard defenses and relevant evidence in products liability actions are discussed in WASHING-TON
STATE BAR Assoc., supra note 146, at 3-42, 4-1 to 4-17, and include: (1) plaintiff's fault; (2) third party's
fault; (3) compliance with industry custom; (4) technological feasibility; (5) compliance with non-
governmental standards; (6) compliance with legislative or administrative regulatory standards; (7)
compliance with specific mandatory government specifications; (8) expiration of the product's useful
safe life; and (9) expiration of the statute of limitations.
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enabling defendants, who are often more capable, both technically and
economically, to limit their liability through apportionment proofs. ' 48
V. CONCLUSION
Placing the burden of apportionment upon the defendant represents the
most flexible and efficient mechanism with which to satisfy the goals and
requirements of the enhanced injury claim. Existing concurrent liability
doctrines only imperfectly parallel the enhanced injury case and may
render inequitable and inconsistent results in certain instances. Placing the
burden on defendants assigns it to the most capable parties-they may limit
their liability through apportionment proofs. This avoids the harsh ap-
proach of the Huddell doctrine, which would deny recovery to an injured
plaintiff not only in all cases where apportionment is "impossible," but
also in many cases where proof is merely difficult or expensive.
Stanton Phillip Beck
148. Uniformly placing this burden upon the defendant(s) clarifies and delineates legal respon-
sibilities which, in turn, provides a firmer foundation upon which manufacturers may decide issues
relating to both design and litigation. But see Comment, supra note 25, at 116. The Comment argues
that placing the burden on the defendant would increase the "nuisance value" ofjoining manufacturers
as defendants. See also supra note 8.
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